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A B S T R A C T
In 2013 the Cape Town municipality initiated planning for the second phase of its MyCiTi bus
system. The first phase, on which preparations commenced in 2007, relied on incorporating
existing road-based operators in a bus rapid transit (BRT) system. The municipality under-
estimated the cost and level of effort involved in the wholesale corporatisation of paratransit
operators while concurrently equipping them to become BRT operators. Learning from this ex-
perience, it developed a more incremental transition approach in the second phase, the first fruit
of which was a pilot express bus service launched in mid-2014. The pilot service contract also
provided for a training programme for paratransit operators in the affected parts of the city to
build their managerial and technical capacity. It was envisaged that programme participants
would ultimately manage and run the long-term operating companies and contracts that would
be established by the end of the three-year interim period. This article provides a critical review
of the programme’s context, content and participant experiences after the conclusion of its first
year. In broad terms the programme has made a positive contribution to paratransit participants’
understanding of the shortcomings of their current operations and why reform might be neces-
sary, but much still remains to be done to enable them to fill their envisaged roles in future public
transport operations. In view of growing interest in BRT installation in Sub-Saharan Africa les-
sons from Cape Town’s reform process offer both cautionary evidence and a potential mechanism
for drawing existing operators in as partners in reform.
1. Introduction
Across cities in Sub-Saharan Africa large fleets of privately owned buses, minibuses and smaller vehicles provide mass public
transport to urban populations. These typically unscheduled services – variously referred to in the scholarly literature as paratransit,
informal or artisanal public transport, or shared taxis – have over many decades come to fill the niche left by the collapse of colonial-
era scheduled bus and rail services (Cervero, 2000; Gwilliam, 2008; Kumar and Barrett, 2008; International Association of Public
Transport [UITP], 2008). Indeed, in the context of weak public sector capacity to regulate supply and enforce licensing regimes,
barriers to market entry are low and the paratransit industry has grown to dominate the urban public transport offering (Kumar and
Barrett, 2008; UITP, 2008, 2010).
Despite their resulting critical role in the lives of multitudes of city dwellers, Behrens et al. (2016), Cervero (2000), Joubert
(2013) and others point to the many shortcomings of paratransit operations. Though total paratransit vehicle fleets might number in
the thousands in a given city and owners may belong to representative organisations at area or region level, ownership is atomised
and financial capital thus dispersed. It is indeed not uncommon for an individual business to comprise only a handful of vehicles.
http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.tra.2017.08.002
Received 18 November 2015; Received in revised form 19 July 2017; Accepted 2 August 2017
E-mail address: herrie.schalekamp@uct.ac.za.
Transportation Research Part A 104 (2017) 58–66
0965-8564/ © 2017 The Author. Published by Elsevier Ltd. This is an open access article under the CC BY-NC-ND license 
(http://creativecommons.org/licenses/BY-NC-ND/4.0/).
MARK
Unless the owner is also the driver, owners furthermore tend not to be directly involved in revenue generation. Drivers agree on a
daily rental fee payable to the owner and take the risk of collecting sufficient fares to cover this fee.1 Any resulting surplus is the
driver’s income. Alternatively the owner and driver might agree on a commission payable to the driver if a minimum number of fares
are collected. In effect drivers manage the business at a day-to-day level, while owners provide the capital.
The core mediator between individual businesses is the route associations or similar collectives. Associations’ main income
derives from owners’ membership fees for the mediation, support and general administrative roles that associations provide. This
relationship incentivises market saturation as it is in the association’s interest to have as many members as possible. In the context of
weak public sector regulation and institutional capacity market entry is thus essentially controlled by route associations. The
paratransit industry often constitutes one of the few employment and income sources in communities and a country where un-
employment is commonplace, and where poor education effectively excludes many from formal employment and tertiary learning.
This compounds atomisation and market saturation: in effect there is a continuous stream of individuals willing to become drivers or
owners without insight into the diluting effect their entry to the market will have on a finite fare income pool.
Overall the paratransit operational model makes for a high level of responsiveness to demand, but it also results in strong (often
destructive) competition on the road, little incentive for comprehensive record-keeping, and limited financial reserves to use towards
vehicle maintenance and replacement. In turn, road and passenger safety suffer, environmental impacts are low priorities, and the
business perspective is focussed largely on individual near-term concerns.
Ultimately the aforementioned issues with the paratransit operational model frustrate efforts at effecting systemic change from
within the industry. It is thus not surprising that public authorities and international agencies have led programmes aimed at ad-
dressing the negative aspects of paratransit operations. Documented examples of in situ upgrade efforts in Africa include the vehicle
renewal schemes instituted in Accra (Finn, 2012), Dakar (Kumar and Diou, 2010), and nationally in South Africa (Van Schalkwyk,
2009). In the cases of Dakar and Accra these schemes included ownership reorganisation.
Bus rapid transit (BRT) as a mechanism to revitalise public transport and displace or incorporate paratransit, as popularised in
Bogota, has arguably received greater attention in the reform discourse. For instance, BRT or BRT-type systems are in operation in
Cape Town (MyCiTi, 2016), Dar es Salaam (Mtulya and Matiko, 2016), Lagos (Mobereola, 2009), Johannesburg (McCaul and Ntuli,
2011) and Pretoria (City of Tshwane, 2016). BRT corridors or systems are furthermore at various stages of planning or completion,
including in Accra (Jones et al., 2015), Addis Ababa (Embarq, 2013), Kampala (Hirsch, 2012), Nairobi (Institute for Transportation
and Development Policy [ITDP], 2015), and in a number of cities in South Africa (Government of South Africa, 2016).
There is a well-developed international pool of resources to support BRT implementation. This includes: technical guidelines (e.g.
ITDP and German International Cooperation Agency [GIZ], 2012 and subsequent revisions, GIZ and Embarq, 2013); scholarly
analyses of systems and operations (for example: Hidalgo and Gutierrez, 2013; Mejía-Dugand et al., 2013; Pedro and Macario, 2017);
and the outputs of the collaborative research centre, Across Latitudes and Cultures – Bus Rapid Transit, based in Santiago. Less well
documented are processes of engaging with paratransit operators around their inclusion in or displacement by BRT systems, and the
accompanying political and planning challenges. Such processes have been demonstrated to be complex, arduous and highly context-
specific. In Latin America, where the BRT concept was refined, in-depth studies on these topics have centred on Bogota and Curitiba
(Ardila-Gomez, 2004), and Mexico City and Santiago (Flores, 2013), while in Africa research has focussed on Cape Town (McLachlan,
2010; Schalekamp, 2015) and Johannesburg (Venter, 2013; Woolf and Joubert, 2013).
Within the public transport reform discourse in Africa the Cape Town case is particularly instructive. A review undertaken for the
South African National Treasury in 2015 projected that revenue in Cape Town’s completed first-phase BRT system, calledMyCiTi, will
cover only 25% of the full cost of running the system in the current financial year (Van Ryneveld, 2015).2 This has been a sobering
realisation; by comparison, paratransit operations receive no operational funding support from the state. Clearly there is a case for
investigating alternative pathways to reform in the African context, since even in relatively well-resourced South Africa the BRT-led
reform model is proving unaffordable. These pathways include in situ improvement and ownership reorganisation approaches as
referred to above, as well as building operators’ capacity to be better equipped to drive change from within their own industry. A shift
away from the BRT model and towards a multi-pronged approach is emerging in Cape Town in the second phase of its public
transport reform programme. The context and substance of this shift are the subjects of this article.
The next section of this article provides an overview of the first phase of the public transport reform process in Cape Town.
Thereafter, Section 3 describes the development of the express bus services that are spearheading the second phase of MyCiTi project,
as well as the origins of the capacity building programme for paratransit operators that forms part of this project phase. Section 4
highlights the aims and structure of the programme as it stood when the N2 Express agreement was finalised in 2014, while Sections
5 and 6 respectively discuss the content and participant experiences during the first year of the programme. In conclusion, Section 7
reflects on the future direction of the programme and concerns that will have to be addressed in the process.
The article draws on 11 semi-structured qualitative interviews that the author conducted with participants in the programme as
well as with key individuals from agencies involved in planning and setting up the programme and in the express bus operations.
These agencies were Transport for Cape Town (TCT, the municipal transport authority), ODA (a consulting agency), and the N2
Express operating entity. In addition to the interviews the author was party to meetings and exchanges with the lead reform process
1 Fares are typically paid in cash on a per-trip basis. Depending on city and route the fares are charged either at a flat rate or have some correlation to distance,
though empirical research on this topic is rare.
2 Revenue sources comprise fares and some additional advertising income, while costs include operating the vehicles, stations and ancillary systems such as fare
management.
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facilitator and the operating entity’s office manager around preparations and on-going arrangements for the programme, as well as
their internal written reports on the programme. The author was also convenor and main facilitator in courses that formed part of the
programme’s first year (see Section 5). This afforded engagement with all programme participants around their learning processes
and experiences of the courses, which supplemented the feedback garnered through the interviews. The author’s resulting partici-
pant-observer role had the potential to introduce bias into responses particularly around the two courses that he presented; such
methodological considerations are discussed further in Section 6.
2. The first phase of the MyCiTi system in Cape Town
In March 2007 the Cape Town municipality released a public transport implementation framework (City of Cape Town [CCT],
2007) that set out its plans to reform a deteriorating system clearly divided along modal lines. The implementation framework
motivated for the installation of a BRT network to replace and absorb existing road-based operations and to fill gaps in the rail
network. At the time the unscheduled minibuses of paratransit operators had a passenger market share estimated to be 63% of road-
based public transport operations, while the remaining 37% of passengers were carried by contracted and scheduled bus services
(CCT, 2007).
Cape Town’s reform model in the 2007 implementation framework proposed not to deal with the aforementioned business model
and operator/association relationship issues head-on, but rather to replace all existing paratransit services with BRT. This model drew
heavily on Bogota’s Transmilénio system in relation to, amongst other matters, infrastructure design, timeline expectations and the
process of existing operator incorporation (see Wood (2014) for an analysis of the diffusion of the South American BRT model to
South Africa).
Detailed preparations for the first project phase of Cape Town’s MyCiTi system started after the 2007 framework was launched,
with an expectation that first-phase trunk and feeder routes would be inaugurated late in 2009. In practice the first trunk route only
became operational in May 2011, while the full suite of initially proposed trunk and feeder routes opened gradually from September
2013 to April 2014. Another unmet expectation was on system finances: rather than fully recovering operating costs from farebox
revenue, MyCiTi would require operational subsidisation from municipal coffers as well as a reduction in hours and routes served
(TCT, 2015).
A critical reason for the delayed completion of the first project phase of the MyCiTi system was that the process of corporatising
paratransit operator groupings, negotiating 12-year gross-cost contracts with them, and educating them to become scheduled bus
operators was significantly more complex than initially anticipated.3 The industry transition process also had to overcome a long-
standing adversarial relationship between government and paratransit operators that had created strong distrust of government
“meddling” in paratransit affairs (Schalekamp, 2015). Transition processes of this type were also previously untested in the country.
Thus, besides taking on the responsibility of planning, constructing, subsidising and managing a new public transport service, the
municipality had to build its institutional capacity to manage the transition and to become acquainted with and guide paratransit
operators and the route associations to which they belonged to form viable vehicle operating companies. In effect, in the first-phase
industry transition process affected operators had to be rushed into forming MyCiTi vehicle operating companies (VOCs) so that they
could start running buses on infrastructure that otherwise would run the risk of standing unused.
A key lesson emerging from first phase of the project is that it is crucial to include reform elements that motivate operators to
become willing partners, while also equipping them to run better businesses irrespective of the type of vehicle that they might
ultimately operate. This is a core driver of the capacity building programme. It is a socially oriented reform element that prepares
operators to better understand how their current businesses could become part of an upgraded public transport system prior to long-
term contractual commitments on the part or operators, or costly infrastructural and modal technology investments on the part of
public authorities.
3. The emergence of a more nuanced reform process in MyCiTi phase 2
After a public call to action by Cape Town’s executive mayor in the last week of 2012, in 2013 planning started on the second
phase of the municipality’s MyCiTi public transport reform project (Coetzee, 2012). The core aim of the project has been the in-
stallation of a new road-based public transport system that would cover the city in a geographically phased manner and incorporate
existing public transport operators. Besides being aimed at the south-eastern sector of the city, which holds the highest concentration
of Cape Town’s poor households, in this second project phase there was a concerted attempt to include the first phase’s lessons around
operator corporatisation and inclusion in the new system, locally referred to as “industry transition” (TCT, 2015). In the first project
phase the municipality underestimated the level of effort involved in corporatising paratransit operators while at the same time
equipping them to become scheduled bus operators, concluding 12-year gross-cost operating contracts with them, and constructing
extensive busway and station infrastructure. Ultimately these efforts were centred on creating a BRT system covering the entire city.
In the second phase the municipality changed its approach, shifting away from “big bang” BRT implementation towards a more
incremental reform process.
The incremental approach introduced stepped changes to operations as well as to the industry transition aspects of the reform
3 In 2014 McLachlan and Schalekamp prepared an unpublished review report for TCT entitledMyCiTi Phase 1 industry transition: Context, development, implementation
and lessons learnt.
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process. To pave the way for the permanent second-phase services that would follow in later years, in July 2014 a three-year interim
pilot service known as the MyCiTi N2 Express was launched. It provides freeway-aligned scheduled bus connections between
Mitchells Plain and Khayelitsha and the main MyCiTi station in the city centre. Both Mitchells Plain and Khayelitsha are large
settlements located on the outskirts of the urban area and the result of apartheid-era urban planning. Under the interim agreement
the two N2 Express routes serving these areas are being managed by a joint venture between existing operator entities whose routes
have been affected by the new service. The joint venture (JV) partners are: the scheduled bus operator in the area (Golden Arrow Bus
Services, or GABS); the paratransit route association (Route 6) operating the Mitchells Plain to central Cape Town route; and the
collective of all the paratransit route associations in Khayelitsha on behalf of its member route association that operates the
Khayelitsha to central Cape Town route. The Khayelitsha collective, or “mother body”, is known as the Congress of Democratic Taxi
Associations (CODETA).
An industry transition facilitator from Organisation Development Africa (ODA) guided the N2 Express negotiations. The facilitator
led the establishment of one of the three vehicle operating entities in the first MyCiTi project phase, and was thus intimately familiar
with the complexities of industry transition. As part of the negotiations in 2013 and 2014 leading to the three-year N2 Express service
contract, TCT (the municipal transport authority) and the JV agreed that a capacity building programme form part of industry
transition in the second project phase. This programme is intended to equip paratransit operators in Mitchells Plain and Khayelitsha
with the skills to run and take ownership of MyCiTi vehicle operating companies (VOCs) that the municipality would help them to set
up and which in time would replace and absorb their paratransit businesses. The inclusion of a training programme in the second
project phase marks an important policy-level shift for Cape Town: from initially expecting operators to be willing partners in a new
mode of transport, to a currently less modally-focussed process that recognises the importance of developing a cohort of existing
operators who can run more effective public transport businesses.
4. Initial aims and structure of the capacity building programme
The capacity building programme and the N2 Express pilot operations have been closely linked since planning on the programme
started in January 2014. By the time that the three-year pilot operating contract will terminate in July 2017 it was the intention that
the programme will have equipped existing paratransit stakeholders with the skills to run and manage scheduled vehicle operating
companies over a longer-term period. A reason why this timing is important is that under the Municipal Finance Management Act
(Act no. 56 of 2003, sec. 33) the municipality is subject to a number of limitations if it wants to enter into a service contract with a
duration of more than three years. At the end of the three-year period the municipality could lose a large degree of flexibility: it
would have to shift to a contract and funding regime overseen by the National Department of Transport and governed by the National
Land Transport Act (Act no. 5 of 2009, sec. 41), and the resulting time horizon of up to 12 years would involve uncertainty and risk
not inherent in the much shorter interim contract.
It was initially planned that the result of the industry transition negotiation process taking place during the interim contract
period would be two MyCiTi VOCs – one in each area. The expectation was that each of these companies would enter into a 12-year
MyCiTi bus operating contract at the termination of the interim contract. In order for paratransit operators to be able to do so the
programme was targeted at training and developing three streams of competence in running a transport business: general man-
agement; technical management; and technicians. The start date of the programme’s activities was to be the same as that of the
interim operating contract, at the beginning of July 2014.
The general and technical management streams would participate in structured training courses in their first two years – a larger
group in the first year, out of which a smaller group would be selected for more in-depth courses in the second and third years. The
courses had to build participants’ understanding and knowledge of the corporate environment, the public transport system in Cape
Town, and scheduled bus service provision. From the middle of their second year, the management stream candidates would also be
placed in trainee positions (“job shadowing”) and be mentored in general or technical management by the appropriate GABS per-
sonnel. The management trainee positions would be with GABS as well as with MyCiTi phase 1 VOCs. Participants in the technician
stream would from their first year be placed in apprenticeship positions in GABS and sent on the training courses that GABS already
had in place for the own employees in the areas of mechanical, electrical, and vehicle body repairs for buses. (GABS’s courses are
officially accredited by a national transport-sector education and training authority, and course graduates would be able to register
with a trade body as qualified artisans.)
The JV was assigned the responsibility for selecting candidates for the programme, prioritising those who showed interest and
potential in becoming the future operators of the city’s reformed public transport system. After their initial identification the can-
didates would undertake psychometric assessments to assist the JV in gauging their learning potential and suitability for placement in
a corporatised public transport operations structure. Upon completion of the programme the JV also had to support successful
participants in finding employment positions in the VOCs, but it was not under an unrealistic obligation to guarantee such placement.
Though only two of the 28 existing route associations were affected by the interim service, the programme had from the outset to
include candidates from all paratransit operations in the two areas that would be affected by MyCiTi in the longer term.
Guided by the transition facilitator the JV aimed to identify 90 candidates for the first year’s structured management stream
training. The number was derived so as to include at least three participants in leadership positions from each of the 28 route
associations, thus ensuring a balance between the two areas geographically. Other pre-requisites for entry to the programme were
that candidates: had completed secondary schooling or equivalent prior learning; had to be between the ages of 30 and 55; were
recognised by their industry colleagues as leaders or managers; and had a stake in the transport industry. In the second year 30
candidates would be selected out of the first year’s group to continue with structured training. From the middle of the second year
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nine of these candidates would also be placed as general management trainees, and a further six as technical management trainees.
In relation to the three-year technical apprenticeship stream the JV had to identify 12 potential candidates, divided equally
amongst the mechanical, electrical, and bus body repair specialisation areas. Candidates had to be resident in either Mitchells Plain or
Khayelitsha and had to have finished their secondary schooling with mathematics and science as subjects.
5. Content of the first year of the programme
Two of the programme activities discussed in Section 4 were scheduled to take place in the first year: structured training for
the±90 participants in the management stream, and the identification and placement of the 12 technicians for their three-year-long
apprenticeships. In practice there were delays in initiating both of these activities, core to which was that the JV was still in the
process of being set up and short on human resources. It lacked a day-to-day manager who could prepare and oversee the programme
at the planned start in July 2014. A core person was needed to, amongst others, identify and interact with training services providers,
assist the JV directors to identify and communicate with candidates, and provide orientation for the candidates. An office manager
was finally appointed in February 2015. This appointment was in itself a capacity building activity, and the office manager was
mentored and supported by staff at ODA to successfully handle the many tasks at hand.
In the months prior to the office manager’s appointment the transition facilitator outlined four structured courses for the man-
agement streams. The topics were informed by his experience in guiding the formation of a first-phase MyCiTi VOC. The resulting
courses were on: (i) South African company law and corporate governance; (ii) an introduction to management and leadership; (iii)
public transport planning and management; and (iv) scheduled bus regulation and operations. From February 2015 detailed pre-
parations ensued, the learning potential psychometric assessments were completed, and three service providers were appointed to
undertake the structured training. Two private sector training firms accredited by the public education and training authority offered
the first two courses; the University of Cape Town’s Centre for Transport Studies offered the latter two courses as continuous pro-
fessional development qualifications.
The four courses ran from April to July 2015. The first was on company law and corporate governance, which 97 participants
completed. It spanned two days and was repeated to enable the overall pool of management candidates to be split into groups of
around 15 at a time, with two sessions running concurrently. This course presented participants with the details of what a company
is, how it is constituted, financial reporting responsibilities, shareholding, and governance structures. The second course was on
management and leadership. There was some attrition in course attendance, with 87 participants completing this course. This course
took place over three days and was again offered to groups of approximately 15 people at a time in two concurrent sessions. It
covered topics such as interpersonal relationships, emotional intelligence, planning, and workload management.
The third and fourth courses had 86 and 80 participants, respectively. Each of these courses spanned two days and was repeated
successively to groups of 20–25 participants at a time. The public transport planning course engaged participants on the concepts of
public transport supply and demand. The course included sessions on choice and captive public transport users, the characteristic of
public transport modes (including paratransit), differences between trunk, feeder and direct services, and a reflection on key sta-
keholders in the public transport arena. The last course, on scheduled bus services, guided participants through a simplified bus fleet
operations and financial planning process on a hypothetical route. Participants were then tasked with determining the profitability of
their own paratransit routes. The course closed with brief distinctions being drawn between different sizes and structures of public
transport enterprises, and between various forms of competition regulation.
There were broadly three categories of participants in the courses: paratransit vehicle owners, vehicle owners who were also route
associations’ executive members, and association administrators (i.e. those who managed the day-to-day activities of associations).
All courses were run in the off-peak paratransit operating hours (± 10 am to 3 pm) so as not to impact too heavily on any of the
aforementioned participants’ day-to-day responsibilities. This was particularly pertinent in the case of participants who were owner-
drivers, as their businesses and related income were in effect suspended during the hours that they attend the courses. Though
participants’ home languages could be English, isiXhosa or Afrikaans, by agreement amongst the course planners the language of
instruction was English as it is South Africa’s main business language. Besides English, course facilitators were also generally con-
versant in Afrikaans, while an isiXhosa translator was attendant during the first two courses and during the first sessions of the latter
two courses.
Participants were assessed in two ways: through a short multiple choice assignment on the course content administered at the end
of each course, and more informally by course facilitators to identify participants who actively engaged with the content, programme
staff and/or other participants. In August 2015 a formal graduation ceremony was held at the municipal council chambers, presided
over by the TCT Commissioner as well as the Mayoral Committee Member for TCT. Participants received certificates for each course,
whether for successful completion, or for attendance in cases where the mark for the assignment was below a passing grade. The
names of the candidates who would go through to the second year of the programme were also announced at the event.
The second programme activity planned for the first year – the appointment of 12 technical apprentices – could not be completed
as planned during the first year of the programme. In April 2015 the JV placed advertisements on local noticeboards and at businesses
to attract candidates. General media could not be used as it would attract responses from outside the Mitchells Plain and Khayelitsha
areas. Many of the responding applicants did not meet the minimum requirements, especially in relation to having mathematics as an
exit subject at school. It took until August 2015 for a full complement of 12 qualifying candidates to be identified. The seven
candidates resident in Khayelitsha and five from Mitchells Plain all signed their apprenticeship contracts in August and started their
training at the end of the same month.
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6. Feedback on the programme’s first year
Interviews with participants (and with the programme planners) were conducted during the month-long period between the
conclusion of the last course and the graduation ceremony. Programme participants who were interviewed thus did not yet know if
they would continue in the programme. It was made clear that the interviewer did not control who would go through to the second
year of the programme so as not to create false expectations that interviewees’ responses or willingness to be interviewed would
improve their chances for selection.
For programme participants the interviews offered the opportunity to evaluate the first year of the programme outside the group
setting of the courses, and without the potential prospect of further participation. Participant interviewees included those both inside
and outside the JV, as well as those who were operators and those who were administrators. Since the interviewer was the facilitator
on two courses, interviewees may have been inclined to respond overly positively on these courses. In cognisance of this issue, during
interviewee selection care was taken to include individuals who voiced opinions both in favour of and in opposition to the overall
programme and the two courses that the interviewer led. During interviews concerted efforts were also made to draw out issues that
presented obstacles to interviewees equally across all courses.
During the interviews the participant interviewees were prompted to reflect on: their expectations of the programme and mo-
tivations for agreeing to participate; the programme content and learning approach of the first year; and unmet expectations or other
issues that the programme should address in future years. These comments were supplemented by observations made by the author
while facilitating the third and fourth courses, and by participants’ comments and input to the author during and after these course
sessions.
In relation to expectations prior to the courses starting, due to the unprecedented nature of the programme there was uncertainty
about the programme’s purpose and about what the individual courses would entail. There was also some degree of scepticism about
the motivations behind the programme due to its association with the MyCiTi project, which could be construed as a government-
funded threat to the paratransit industry. However, there was also curiosity about the programme, with one interviewee saying: “let’s
go to school and learn.” Another interviewee expected that the programme was only going to comprise short workshops for operators
to learn more about how transport works, as opposed to the more in-depth nature of the courses in practice.
The first course – on company law and corporate governance – appeared to present some learning obstacles. A number of new
concepts and a large quantity of information were being conveyed in a short space of time, which some found overwhelming. Prior to
this course very few participants had experience of corporate practices, so the course content was unfamiliar. Furthermore, for many
this would have been their first exposure to further education. A tertiary level lecture-type format would have been a new experience
and participants could not be expected to have all the skills required to assimilate knowledge in such a setting. In the words of one
interviewee: “we are used to working, not listening”. This comment also applied to the presentation style of the management and
leadership course, though this course did also involve group and self-completion activities. Despite apparent issues with the teaching
format of the first two courses, one interviewee recounted that both helped her to recognise the importance of managing people.
Another recognised the importance of becoming familiar with the corporate environment and suggested that the company law course
be repeated but in a more accessible format. It seems that the first two courses’ content was appropriate, but that attention should be
given to the approach to learning to match the capabilities of participants.
A planner at TCT noted that it was a general problem that the mindset and needs of people in the paratransit industry was not well
understood. He noted that this lack of understanding was common amongst civil servants and consultants, who rarely worked directly
with paratransit operators. In the context of the programme this also explained participants’ comments on the first two courses’
training approach. These courses’ facilitators would commonly work with corporate clients with very different educational back-
grounds and day-to-day work environments compared to a paratransit audience. It would be a challenging task indeed to adapt
existing courses’ content and learning formats to such an unknown audience.
The reception of the third and fourth courses – respectively on public transport planning, and on scheduled bus operations – was
more positive than that of the first two courses. (This was the case despite the efforts mentioned at the beginning of this section to
manage bias due to the interviewer’s participant-observer status on these courses.) Firstly, these courses were on topics that were
more familiar to participants: the vast majority of them were directly involved in public transport operations on a daily basis and
could engage more easily with the courses’ content. Secondly, the courses were developed specifically for the programme and for
these participants. Through the facilitator’s prior research amongst and engagement with paratransit operators (see Schalekamp,
2015) it was an easier task to set the content and training format at an appropriate level, and, moreover, to develop a rapport with
participants. As a result most of the sessions were highly interactive and rather resembled group discussions than lectures. Thirdly,
these courses were presented on the University of Cape Town’s campus, which elicited great pride amongst participants. Both during
interviews and course sessions participants commented that they never would have expected to get the opportunity to be at a
university, with one capturing it simply and powerfully: “I’m at UCT!” To people whose core business was commonly villainised, the
legitimisation of their existence in this manner emerged strongly as a positive experience amongst participants.
The component of the transport-oriented courses that was commented on most frequently was the session during which the
facilitator and participants collectively determined the profitability of a paratransit business. The facilitator drew up a spreadsheet
using a laptop and projector, with participants providing the cost and income line items and debating the values that should be
assigned to each. During the interviews and after the sessions many participants remarked that the exercise helped them to better
understand their present businesses from a financial point of view and that financial record-keeping could be a great tool for them to
improve their own businesses. Nonetheless, as reported during the interviews and from observations during sessions it was clear that
many participants struggled with assimilating the knowledge necessary to be able to do comprehensive financial and fleet planning
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unassisted after just one short course.
The interviews suggested that the first year’s courses were too theoretical and limited in duration and depth to make a direct
impact on the way that participants conducted business, but importantly also that to date the programme has succeeded in creating
consciousness of the broader transport and business environments in which participants operated. One participant interviewee
captured the sentiment by remarking that the courses opened his eyes to the complexity of doing business in a “formal” (i.e. cor-
porate) environment, while another stated that the programme provided “psychological preparation” for reform. These are sig-
nificant steps forward when viewed against the initial scepticism with which participants entered into the courses.
7. Programme continuation
On 1 September 2015, a week after the graduation ceremony, the Mayoral Committee Member for TCT announced a fundamental
shift in the municipality’s approach to public transport reform (“Game-changing policy …”, 2015). Rather than consolidating all
paratransit operations in Khayelitsha and Mitchells Plain into BRT operating companies to run MyCiTi services, the municipality
would focus on assisting associations and operators to form transport operating companies (TOCs) to run minibuses as an integral
part of the MyCiTi system. Existing paratransit operating license-holders would exchange their licenses for shares in a TOC, with the
potential for the municipality to help fund the capitalisation of the TOC as its financial contribution to industry transition. This move
could also allow TOCs to adjust vehicle and fleet sizes to be more appropriate to passenger demand. Where TOCs operate from the
same public transport interchange facility the municipality could also assist such TOCs to collectively form a regional transport
company (RTC). This joint company could manage the interchange facility as well as related depot, security, advertising and other
services.
It might be the case that some route associations will have to be combined into a TOC to make it a financially viable entity. The
municipality will have to conduct surveys to assess such viability, but a likely result is that there will be fewer companies than the
current number of 28 route associations in the two areas. As part of the preparations for the second year of the programme the
planners identified particular management positions that would have to be filled in the resulting TOCs and RTCs, as well as the
knowledge areas in which such candidates’ skills should be developed. The planners also conducted a skills audit amongst the initial
year’s group of± 90 programme participants. From this audit (see summary of results in Table 1), as well as the course and learning
potential assessments, the planners identified individual participants who showed promise to take up management positions in the
new companies in due course. Rather than the initially proposed number of 30 candidates, due to budget savings on the programme
in the first year a total of 46 such candidates continued into the second year.
The topics that underpin the programme’s second year courses include public transport operations and company set-up in greater
detail than in the first year, as well as human resource management, business planning, financial management, and contractual
agreements and related negotiation skills. These courses will take into account participant feedback, paying particular attention to
making strong connections between the presented content, candidates’ own experiences, and the operations of the envisaged
Table 1
Summary of skills audit amongst year 1 programme participants.
All participants in year 1 Participants in year 1 who did not continue to
year 2
Participants in year 1 who continued to
year 2
Total number of participants 89 43 46
Female 26 9 17
Male 63 34 29
Basic education
Finished high school (grade 12) 41 13 28
Finished grade 9–11 24 12 12
Computer literate 27 12 15
Other education
Certificate 21 10 11
Diploma 13 3 10
Degree 1 0 1
Professional qualifications
Driver’s license 66 32 34
Professional driving permita 15 6 9
Industry positions
Association chairperson 5 2 3
Association secretary 6 1 5
Association treasurer – b 2
Association office management – b 6
Vehicle owner – b 14
Vehicle driver – b 2
a A legal requirement for transporting passengers or goods for reward.
b Data not collected for this group of participants.
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companies and vehicle fleets.
There are some concerns from a reform management point of view that span well beyond those who will have successfully
concluded the programme. A first concern is that the three years that have been set aside for the programme and for the interim
vehicle operating contract will likely be insufficient to adequately capacitate candidates who might run the new companies. This
applies equally to the management positions and to the technical apprenticeships. Should the three years be inadequate then there is
the real risk of mismanagement within the new companies due to a lack of practical experience amongst the new corps of managers.
This will have to be assessed on an on-going basis once such companies are formed, but the looming conversion of the three-year
interim contract to 12-year vehicle operating contracts concluded with each of the TOCs is a constant factor placing pressure on the
industry transition team. A second key concern is around managing the social and employment aspects of the reform process. A
possibility that the programme planners are aware of is that too few people will have been capacitated at the end of the programme to
populate the new companies. A register has been created of the participants in the first year of the programme who are not part of the
46 continuing candidates. They will be prioritised for employment within the new companies should opportunities present them-
selves, though they will not have had the benefit of the on-going training that the continuing candidates will be party to. A third
concern is that three years might not be enough to establish the new companies and/or for the 12-year contracts to be in place. The
candidates successfully completing the capacity building programme would thus stand idle, with neither a certain prospect of further
training or of employment outside their current positions in the paratransit industry.
There is, however, also the much larger group of people who have had little or no exposure to the reform process except by word
of mouth through colleagues participating in the programme. This group includes the majority of the 28 associations’ operator
members and administrators, as well as the rank staff and vehicle drivers who are part of the paratransit industry in the two areas.
There is a clear need for an industry-wide information and education campaign to manage the expectations of those who could not be
accommodated in the programme. This is something that ODA proposed initially, but it fell outside the scope of what could be
included in the three-year interim contract.
8. General reflection and conclusions
Though there is a variety of training courses in existence in the open market that might target aspects of existing paratransit
operations, there is a dearth of programmes aimed at the paratransit sector that are directly connected with building operators’
capacity to participate in conversations around reshaping public transport services. When it was initiated the capacity building
programme in Cape Town was unique in South Africa in that it was a pre-emptive attempt to support and train paratransit operators
prior to their involvement in full-scale reform and negotiation processes. Since 2016 there have been indications that other cities and
regions in South Africa have set out to plan and run similar programmes. Notable examples are the City of Johannesburg, which has
partnered with the University of the Witwatersrand, and the City of Polokwane with the University of Limpopo - both targeting
similar groups of operators as those in Cape Town. Should the process and progress of these programmes be systematically researched
it could serve as a grounds for comparison with the Cape Town programme and broader reform effort in South Africa. It could also
provide motivation for other cities and higher education institutions in and beyond this country to engage in similar endeavours.
Thus, the scholars involved in such existing and future programmes beyond Cape Town should be urged to document their efforts and
outcomes.
Monitoring the impacts of such programmes in practice on an ongoing basis should also be flagged as a worthwhile undertaking.
This is difficult to measure in a quantitative manner, but the programme evaluation to date in Cape Town suggests that important
impacts include positive shifts in the business practices of paratransit operators within their existing paratransit business context, and
in their attitude towards participation in government-led reform programmes. As discussed in the third section of this article, the
Cape Town programme was conceived to align with a refocused policy vision; that is, away from comprehensive BRT installation and
towards a more inclusive approach relying on upgraded paratransit services and only selective investment in new infrastructure and
services. Cities in South Africa and indeed elsewhere in Sub-Saharan Africa are attempting to overhaul public transport systems
dominated by paratransit operations by replacing them with and/or incorporating them in BRT systems, with numerous risks.
Evidence suggests that in many of these cities there has been resistance from paratransit operators to participate in reform, proposed
implementation timeframes had to be extended in practice, or the scope of reform projects had to be scaled back due to capital and/or
operating funding challenges. The potential of securing participation from the paratransit sector in public transport reform through
targeted capacity building is a topic worthy of exploration, especially if such training could lead to their informed and voluntary
participation in reform processes and, crucially, to stimulate self-driven improvements in existing paratransit operations.
Understanding and documenting the impacts of capacity building programmes amongst paratransit operators is also relevant in
view of the limited scholarly literature on practical experiences with, and alternative approaches to, public transport reform in Sub-
Saharan African cities. Such alternatives include working with paratransit operators to understand their attitudes to reform and to
develop their professional skills to manage their businesses more effectively. As discussed in the introductory section of this article,
the discourse in the public transport reform arena in this region is dominated by discussions and literature on the benefits and
technical considerations of installing BRT as the main means of bringing about positive change in the public transport sector, with
little voice given to the complexities, costs and failures of getting this approach to work effectively in cooperation with the dominant
existing service providers. That urban public transport systems in the entire region are in need of improvement is unlikely to be
questioned; what is still a necessity, however, is to expand the existing discourse with accounts from across the region of both the
successes and failures of processes that aim to reform these systems in practice.
A last point is that there is a social equity aspect to paratransit capacity building programmes, and one in which higher education
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institutions might play a role. Paratransit operators across Sub-Saharan Africa provide a critical urban service, yet this contribution to
society is often overshadowed by the shortcomings of their operational model. Operators are certainly not without blame for
competing violently on the road or for insufficient fleet maintenance, yet the lack of decisive action on the part of government
agencies to bring public resources to bear on these and related problems could well be an equally important contributing factor. With
the paratransit sector being highly atomised there is much scope for perceived power imbalances and distrust to emerge in this
sector’s relationship with government. Capacity building programmes such as that referred to in this article could contribute in a
meaningful way to levelling the playing field and opening constructive channels of communication between operators and gov-
ernment. This could, amongst others, be spurred on by equipping operators to reflect critically on their business practices, understand
their role in the transport ecosystem, and be exposed to constructive ways in which to manage conflict and engage with authorities.
What the Cape Town programme has also demonstrated is that a university can provide a space and guidance for these crucial
discussions to take place, and as such become a direct role-player in transformative action.
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